Economic Security
The cross-cutting policy area organizing much of the 2026 review — non-market content, foreign investment, customs circumvention, critical minerals, and whether USMCA’s benefits accrue primarily to the three parties.
Last reviewed and updated: October 18, 2026 · Next scheduled events: Fourth U.S.–Mexico negotiating round (Ebrard, Oct. 16: “tiene que ser antes del fin de año”; ICPA has located no announced date as of Oct. 18) · Polysilicon MIP and 15% derivative duty, Dec. 4, 2026 · Joint review comments and hearing requests due to USTR, Jan. 12, 2027 · ← Back to Review Watch
“Economic security” is not a defined USMCA obligation, and no treaty amendment creating one has been identified as legally effective as of October 18, 2026. It is a negotiating and policy label applied to existing chapters — rules of origin, customs, investment, digital trade, state-owned enterprises, and trade remedies — unless and until a legally effective change is adopted under an authorized mechanism.
Five-Minute Briefing
Everything a compliance professional needs before the details.
Economic security is the organizing rationale most likely to shape whether the United States eventually confirms a 16-year extension. It cuts across rules of origin, customs enforcement, investment screening, export controls, critical minerals, forced labor, and state-owned enterprises — meaning changes here can reach into sourcing, ownership structure, and supply-chain documentation even without a single dedicated treaty chapter.
USTR expressly included economic security in its September 2025 comment request. The U.S. and Mexico opened formal bilateral review negotiations in March 2026 directed at ensuring USMCA benefits accrue primarily to the parties. Economic security has been on the agenda of all three 2026 negotiating rounds. Mexico published an updated export-control measure for dual-use items in July 2026 that more closely aligns with U.S. controls — the first concrete, government-confirmed economic-security action of the review.
Canadian government briefing materials describe possible U.S. interest in a Critical Minerals Marketplace and in mechanisms that would penalize or discourage relocation of U.S. production to Mexico or Canada. Neither has a public negotiating text. ICPA has not located a trilateral definition of “economic security,” a finalized investment-screening framework, or a public list of targeted non-market entities, sectors, or countries.
Potential areas of change include stronger industrial rules of origin targeting non-party content, coordinated investment screening, tariff and trade-remedy alignment against non-market economies, a critical-minerals framework, export-control coordination, forced-labor enforcement alignment, and enhanced customs data and verification rules. None of these have been adopted as legally effective changes.
The two newest U.S. tariff actions treat USMCA origin differently. The Section 338 duties on Canadian goods apply “regardless of whether a good originates under the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA),” so origin gives no relief there, while the forced-labor Section 301 action carries an exemption for USMCA-compliant goods, which raises the practical stakes on origin proof, customs traceability, and supply-chain diligence for that action. Dated items now on the calendar:
- Screen Canadian-origin SKUs against the current Section 338 lists: the duties have applied since August 22, 2026, the product list changed on September 15, 2026 (CSMS #69851916), and goods on the September 29 import-exclusion annexes imported at or after 12:01 a.m. ET on September 29 are excluded from importation; covered goods imported before then remain eligible to be entered for consumption, and goods placed in a bonded warehouse or FTZ before then may be withdrawn at the 50% duty (CSMS #70050970)
- Confirm which shipments rely on USMCA qualification versus separate Section 338 or forced-labor Section 301 treatment, and substantiate origin accordingly
- Review forced-labor supplier due diligence and customs evidence for non-party and high-risk sourcing
- Review export-control classification for dual-use items moving through Mexico under its updated July 2026 measure
- If you import polysilicon, ingots, wafers, solar cells or modules: start building the minimum-import-price documentation now for the December 4, 2026 effective date, and check whether any first arm’s-length sale sits under a fixed-term contract predating August 6, 2026. Missing documentation converts the MIP itself into the duty, and if CBP determines the documentation was materially inaccurate or the certification materially breached, the importer and its affiliates are permanently prohibited from importing polysilicon and polysilicon derivatives
- If you enter USMCA-qualifying Canadian or Mexican goods under Proclamation 11032: review the October 14 BIS guidance to CBP defining “U.S. content” for goods entered on or after October 14, 2026; it sets out no filing procedure and directs product-specific questions to CBP
- Track the fourth U.S.–Mexico round for economic-security text: Secretary Ebrard said on October 16 that it “tiene que ser antes del fin de año”; as of October 18, ICPA has located no announced date
Do not restructure ownership, relocate production, or revise origin certifications in anticipation of investment-screening, relocation-penalty, or U.S.-specific content measures that have not been published in negotiating text.
Confirmed Developments
Official government actions and confirmed events relevant to economic security since the previous verification pass. None of these amends the USMCA text; several change bargaining leverage or raise compliance stakes.
Appearing on October 16 before the Cámara de Diputados’ Comisiones Unidas de Economía, Comercio y Competitividad and de Economía Social y Fomento del Cooperativismo, Secretary of Economy Marcelo Ebrard said, according to the Secretaría de Economía transcript: “estamos por determinar la cuarta ronda de conversaciones, tiene que ser antes del fin de año, con Estados Unidos.” He gave no date. On the agreement’s term he said what the United States announced was “un periodo de 10 años con revisión anual, no es lo que más nos gusta,” adding “nos gustaría 16 años en revisión, pero está el tratado vigente.” He referred to “el 80% del comercio de México con Estados Unidos sin aranceles,” recalled the early risk that “se nos pusiera 25 por ciento a todo lo que exportamos,” and credited the President with having convinced President Trump “de no aplicar el 25 por ciento.” He said President Sheinbaum “ha invitado personalmente a Jamieson Greer, que es el titular de la USTR,” and has received him twice at Palacio Nacional. The transcript does not address the sectoral steel, aluminum or auto tariffs or the foreign-investment screening bill. ICPA analysis, not stated in the source: as of October 18, ICPA has located no announced date for the fourth U.S.–Mexico round; the 10-year term with annual review is the Mexican officials’ account of the U.S. position, not a U.S. announcement or a concluded outcome (see the Oct 12 and Oct 13 entries below). Secretaría de Economía, versión estenográfica, Oct 16 ↗
In a tarjeta informativa of October 16, the Secretaría de Economía said the October 13 decree (see the Oct 13 entry below) had generated “diversas interpretaciones” and set out how it will operate. The benefit reaches “únicamente las empresas con instalaciones productivas en México, esto es solamente 11 fabricantes de vehículos ligeros,” which must hold a depósito fiscal authorization for vehicle assembly and manufacturing, and “las importaciones estarán sujetas a permiso previo por parte de la Secretaría de Economía,” with SAT and ANAM controlling the imports. The Lineamientos SE will issue provide that companies must report the vehicle identification numbers of assembled units and supply information allowing traceability of the imported parts, and will set minimum production volumes of complete vehicles in Mexico and cap imports as a proportion of that production (no figure stated). ICPA analysis, not stated in the source: as of October 18, ICPA has not located the published Lineamientos. SE added that this tariff code accounted for 0.01% of total automotive imports in 2025, and said the decree will not facilitate imports by companies without productive facilities in Mexico or of vehicles from countries without a trade agreement with Mexico. The release does not mention the T-MEC or the United States. ICPA analysis, not stated in the source: this is a conditional Mexican duty benefit for eligible vehicle makers importing into Mexico; it creates no U.S. entry obligation. Secretaría de Economía, tarjeta informativa, Oct 16 ↗
The Bureau of Industry and Security published guidance to CBP (91 FR 65162, FR Doc. 2026-20938, Docket No. 260918-0056) on assessing “U.S. content” for products of Canada and Mexico that qualify for USMCA preferential treatment, for purposes of clause (2)(d) of Proclamation 11032 of June 1, 2026. U.S. content means “1. The value of the product attributable to parts wholly obtained, entirely produced, or substantially transformed in the United States, and 2. To the extent not otherwise accounted for in (1), the value of the product attributable to steel that was melted and poured in the United States, aluminum that was smelted and cast in the United States, and/or copper that was smelted and cast in the United States.” The guidance is effective “with respect to products that are entered for consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after 12:01 a.m. Eastern Time on October 14, 2026.” It sets out no filing procedure and directs product-specific questions to CBP. Under Proclamation 11032 itself (91 FR 34085, FR Doc. 2026-11314), the 25% duty applies to the non-U.S. content of Annex I-C articles with a 15% minimum effective duty for entries June 8, 2026 through December 31, 2027; the BIS notice does not restate these terms. ICPA analysis, not stated in the source: the notice does not mention entry reporting or any CSMS message, and ICPA has located no CBP message implementing the definition as of October 18. Federal Register, 91 FR 65162, Oct 14 ↗
A decree modifying the Tarifa de la Ley de los Impuestos Generales de Importación y de Exportación, signed October 9 and published in the Diario Oficial de la Federación on October 13, 2026, makes fracción 9803.00.01, parts and components for vehicle assembly, exempt (“Ex.”) from the 10% ad valorem general import duty. The fracción is limited to terminal automotive-industry companies holding a depósito fiscal authorization for vehicle assembly and manufacturing under the Ley Aduanera and complying with lineamientos the Secretaría de Economía will issue; the considerandos reference SKD and CKD assembly schemes. The sole transitory article provides: “El presente decreto entra en vigor al día siguiente de su publicación en el Diario Oficial de la Federación y tendrá una vigencia de cinco años contados a partir de su entrada en vigor,” so the exemption applies from October 14, 2026. The decree does not mention the T-MEC or the United States of America (“Estados Unidos” appears only in “Estados Unidos Mexicanos”). The operating conditions SE set out on October 16 are in the entry above. ICPA analysis, not stated in the source: the decree grants a conditional exemption to eligible vehicle makers importing into Mexico; it imposes no new duty and creates no U.S. entry obligation. Diario Oficial de la Federación, Oct 13 ↗
In media remarks at the Cámara de Diputados published by the Secretaría de Economía on October 13, Secretary Ebrard said: “el tratado está acordado para los próximos 10 años. Es decir, el convenio con Estados Unidos, lo que se dio a conocer, es que el tratado va a tener una revisión anual, pero va a durar 10 años.” Asked about increases due to go to the Chamber floor, he said he would appear on Friday and that “Lo principal es la revisión del tratado.” He credited congressional backing in the negotiations with the United States, said President Trump “ha tenido más de 21 llamadas o 22” and “ha intervenido en todos estos procesos de manera directa,” and said “creció 16.8% la exportación de México a Estados Unidos.” He did not address the fourth round or the sectoral tariffs on steel, aluminum and autos. ICPA analysis, not stated in the source: this is the Mexican Secretary’s account of the U.S. position, not a U.S. announcement or a concluded outcome; ICPA has located no U.S. government statement confirming an agreed 10-year term, and on October 16 Ebrard said the same term “no es lo que más nos gusta” (see the Oct 16 entry above). Secretaría de Economía, Oct 13 ↗
At her October 12 press conference President Sheinbaum said the issue is not “terminar con el T-MEC”: the agreement provided that after six years the parties would decide whether it continues for the following 10 years or is extended 16 years, and “nosotros pedimos que se ampliara por 16 años y Estados Unidos planteó que se mantiene 10 años con una revisión anual,” adding that a new decision could be taken “en un año, en dos o tres.” She said “lo que decidió Estados Unidos es negociar por aparte Canadá y México,” that “hay aranceles en automóviles, en acero y aluminio,” and that “lo que nosotros queremos es la disminución de esos aranceles.” She added: “Hay avances. Todavía no tenemos un acuerdo final, pero seguimos dialogando.” ICPA analysis, not stated in the source: the 10-year term with annual review is Mexico’s account of the U.S. position, not a U.S. announcement or a concluded outcome; it updates the “solo 10 años” remark in the Sep 21 entry below. Presidencia, versión estenográfica, Oct 12 ↗
At her October 9 press conference President Sheinbaum described the previous day’s meeting with U.S. Ambassador Ronald Johnson (a reporter asked about “su reunión ayer con el embajador Johnson”): “él trajo a la Delegación de la American Chamber, que son empresarios”; “Estuvo presente el presidente del Consejo Coordinador Empresarial,” along with “representantes mexicanos de empresas exportadoras del acero.” She said the meeting was “relacionada con el comercio y con el ambiente favorable para la inversión” and stated: “Y nosotros lo que queremos es que disminuyan los aranceles de autos y de acero que siguen presentes en la relación comercial.” She framed the relationship under the Constitution, the Ley de Seguridad Nacional and four principles (integridad territorial, respeto a la soberanía, confianza mutua y coordinación sin subordinación), said “estamos en el diálogo con Estados Unidos,” and noted that “al presidente Trump le preocupa el déficit.” No fourth-round date was given. Presidencia, versión estenográfica, Oct 9 ↗
USTR announced that it “convened a meeting of senior officials of 14 economies” “on the margins of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Trade Committee,” building on “the productive discussions at the G20 Trade Ministerial in Milwaukee,” and that “these fourteen economies joined the United States in signing a Joint Ministerial Statement” to address global excess capacity and production in key manufacturing sectors. The signatories are the trade ministers of Argentina, Australia, Canada, the European Union, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Poland, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the United States. The statement expresses the signatories’ “collective resolve” to work together in new, dedicated sectoral platforms, starting “with Autos and EVs, Batteries, Chemicals, Foundational Semiconductors, and Solar Panels,” and “calls on all countries” to end the use of “non-market policies and practices” that distort markets. The signatories will meet “before December 2026, at the technical level, to develop terms of reference; share non-confidential information and data,” and the statement says countries should “cooperate, share information, and take complementary action, wherever possible.” The statement does not mention the USMCA. ICPA analysis, not stated in the source: with Canada and Mexico both signing, all three USMCA parties are now on record alongside the United States on the non-market-policies agenda that the joint-review comment notice also raises (see the Oct 2 entry above); Canada, which is not named in the October 2 forced-labor statement, does sign this one; and the statement is a ministerial declaration of intent that imposes no filing or duty obligation on importers. USTR, Oct 7 ↗ Joint Ministerial Statement (PDF) ↗
USTR announced that the trade ministers of the United States, Mexico and Argentina agreed to the issuance of a statement on eliminating forced labor in global supply chains on the margins of the G20 Trade Ministerial in Milwaukee. Ambassador Greer said: “I applaud my colleagues from Mexico and Argentina for siding with moral and economic reality and recognizing the continued existence of forced labor as an abhorrent human rights issue that distorts global supply chains.” The release names only the United States, Mexico and Argentina as parties to the statement; Canada is not mentioned. The statement was made at the G20, not in the USMCA joint review. The separate Chair’s Statement of the G20 Trade Ministerial (USTR, same date) records that ministers did not reach consensus on forced labor, while “many G20 members expressed resolve to address structural excess capacity and production in key sectors…” ICPA analysis, not stated in the source: read alongside the forced-labor Section 301 entries already on this page, the statement places Mexico alongside the U.S. position on forced-labor enforcement; Canada is not named in either document. USTR, Oct 2 ↗ USTR, Chair’s Statement, Oct 2 ↗
USTR filed a Federal Register notice (FR Doc. 2026-20341, on public inspection October 2 and published in the Federal Register on October 5, 2026, at 91 FR 63379) requesting public comment and announcing a public hearing on the operation of the Agreement ahead of the 2027 joint review. Written comments (docket USTR-2026-0595) and requests to appear at the hearing with a testimony summary (docket USTR-2026-0596) are due by 11:59 p.m. EST on January 12, 2027 via comments.ustr.gov; the hearing date and location will be posted on ustr.gov, and rebuttal comments are due seven calendar days after the last day of the hearing. Among its listed topics, the notice asks for views on factors affecting the North American investment climate and on “Strategies for strengthening North American economic security and competitiveness and cooperation on issues related to non-market policies and practices of other countries.” The notice is a comment opportunity and creates no importer obligation. Federal Register public inspection, FR Doc. 2026-20341 ↗ Federal Register, 91 FR 63379, Oct 5 ↗ USTR press release, Oct 2 ↗
The Senate approved the reform to the Ley de Inversión Extranjera by 65 votes to 30 in general and 65 to 28 in particular, and sent the dictamen to the Cámara de Diputados. The bill adds the Secretariats of National Defense, Navy, and Security and Citizen Protection to the National Foreign Investment Commission (CNIE) with voice and vote, and gives the FGR, CNI, SAT and UIF a voice without vote on national-security matters. A favorable CNIE resolution would be required for foreign investment to hold, directly or indirectly, more than 49 percent of the capital of a Mexican company whose total assets exceed an amount the Commission sets, in areas including critical and dual-use technologies (AI, robotics, semiconductors, cybersecurity, aerospace, defense, energy storage, quantum, nuclear, nanotechnology and biotechnology), the supply of essential inputs such as energy or raw materials, food security, and access to sensitive information, in particular personal data. Fines of 5,000 to 200,000 times the daily UMA would apply for failing to comply with a CNIE denial resolution or with imposed mitigation measures. This is a bill, not law: it has passed the Senate only and now goes to the Chamber of Deputies, so none of these requirements is in force. It is the investment-screening bill this page recorded reaching Senate committees on August 31 (see the Aug 31 entry above) and whose committee session was reported postponed on September 23 (see the Sep 23 row in the Timeline). Senado de la República, Sep 30 ↗
Asked at her September 29 press conference about Secretary Ebrard’s meetings, President Sheinbaum said: “Vamos bien, todavía no cerramos un acuerdo mayor. Nuestro objetivo obviamente es disminuir aranceles de acero y vehículos, y que no haya más aranceles. Y para ello, son una serie de acuerdos en los que estamos trabajando conjuntamente donde en ningún caso se vulnera la soberanía o nuestra visión del desarrollo.” She said the teams were meeting that week and that she would report afterwards (“se reúnen esta semana y ya les estaremos informando”). No agreement text and no fourth-round date were given. Presidencia, versión estenográfica, Sep 29 ↗
CBP’s CSMS # 70050970 implements Proclamations 11061 (alcoholic beverages), 11062 (dairy) and 11063 (motor vehicles). From 12:01 a.m. ET on September 29, 2026, covered products of Canada classified in HTSUS headings 0404, 1702, 1703, 2202–2208 and 8711 are excluded from importation: “Exclusion from importation precludes covered products from admission into a Foreign Trade Zone or bonded warehouse, in-bond transportation, and entry for consumption.” ACE rejects noncompliant transactions with error code 239 (e214 FTZ admission), 335 (cargo release) and 886 (entry summary). Covered products imported before 12:01 a.m. ET on September 29, 2026 remain eligible to be entered for consumption, and those “entered into a bonded warehouse or admitted into a Foreign Trade Zone prior to exclusion from importation going into effect, may be withdrawn for consumption” at the 50 percent ad valorem duty imposed under Proclamations 11046, 11047 and 11048, as applicable. The message does not mention USMCA and sets out no exception for USMCA-qualifying goods. CBP CSMS # 70050970, Sep 28 ↗
At her September 21 press conference President Sheinbaum said the United States had set out 54 points for Mexico to resolve in order to advance a reduction of the duties on steel, aluminum, their derivatives and vehicles (ICPA analysis, not stated in the source: these are the Section 232 duties), and that “Esos 54 puntos se convirtieron casi en 90, porque hay otros temas que nos han estado planteando.” She said Washington’s aim is that there be “no déficit,” and that Mexico is examining how to buy from the United States instead of from other countries to reduce that deficit (“estamos buscando qué se podría hacer para que, en vez de comprar de otros países del mundo, le compremos a Estados Unidos”); no quantified purchase commitment is stated. On the treaty itself, she said the review was to determine whether the agreement would be extended for 16 years or only 10, and that the United States said “no, solo 10 años y vamos revisando los problemas.” She said conversations on the second line of work, which she had just described as the Treaty itself, would take place toward the end of September (“En la segunda va a haber conversaciones hacia finales de septiembre”), and that Secretary of Economy Marcelo Ebrard coordinates both lines of work. Presidencia, versión estenográfica, Sep 21 ↗
At her September 18 press conference President Sheinbaum confirmed a Wednesday call with President Trump in which Foreign Secretary Roberto Velasco and Economy Secretary Marcelo Ebrard participated: “vamos avanzando, va avanzando bien la posibilidad de un acuerdo con nosotros, México-Estados Unidos, y fue muy buena la llamada, llegamos a algunos acuerdos, pero hasta que no esté el acuerdo final no podríamos darlo a conocer.” She added that the U.S. decision to raise tariffs “hace que el T-MEC no se esté conservando o se esté preservando la idea original, que es cero aranceles en la gran mayoría de los productos.” No fourth-round date was given. Presidencia, versión estenográfica, Sep 18 ↗
USTR, with DHS, CBP and the Department of Labor, “convened representatives of over 50 trading partners from around the world to provide training related to imposing and effectively enforcing forced labor import prohibitions.” The release credits U.S. legislative and trade-agreement efforts and USTR’s Section 301 forced-labor investigation for the fact that “by July 2026, 12 additional economies had adopted measures that prohibit the importation of goods made by forced labor, including Cambodia, Canada, Ecuador, the European Union, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Trinidad and Tobago.” ICPA analysis, not stated in the source: forced-labor import restrictions remain an active element of U.S. engagement with both USMCA partners; the release creates no new filing, payment or documentation requirement for U.S. importers. USTR, Sep 15 ↗
CBP’s CSMS # 69851916 implements Proclamations 11064 and 11065 for goods entered for consumption or withdrawn from warehouse on or after 12:01 a.m. ET September 15, 2026. The attached list “provides the complete list of HTSUS classifications subject to Section 338 duties as of September 15, 2026, including 122 additional HTSUS classifications now subject to HTSUS 9903.03.12 or HTSUS 9903.03.14.” Ten classifications come off: 2208.30.60 and 2208.70.00 from 9903.03.12, and 2501.00.00 (salt), 2523.29.00 (Portland cement), 2940.00.60, 4803.00.40, 4818.90.00, 7801.10.00, 8537.10.91 and 9507.10.00 from 9903.03.14; the 9903.03.13 dairy list is unchanged. CBP states: “As of September 15, 2026, only goods subject to HTSUS 9903.03.13 are eligible to claim HTSUS 9903.03.15.” The additional duties remain eligible for drawback, and the Chapter 98 and FTZ privileged-foreign-status rules are restated. ICPA analysis, not stated in the source: importers of Canadian-origin goods should re-run the attached “Section 338 Canada Modified HTS LIST eff 091526” against their Chapter 99 filing logic, because coverage changed in both directions, and CBP’s August 21 guidance (CSMS # 69606660) sets out no USMCA exception, and the White House fact sheet states the duties apply “regardless of whether a good originates under the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).” Read with Proclamation 11065, goods under 9903.03.12 and 9903.03.14 now carry the 50 percent Section 338 duty on top of any Section 232 duty. CBP CSMS # 69851916, Sep 11 ↗
On September 8 the President signed five proclamations under Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930, published in the Federal Register on September 14 as Proclamations 11061 through 11065. Three exclude the Canadian products listed in their annexes from importation “effective with respect to goods imported on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern time on September 29, 2026”: alcoholic beverages (11061, 91 FR 58311), dairy-related products (11062, 91 FR 58319) and motor-vehicle-sector products (11063, 91 FR 58325). Covered goods imported but not entered for consumption before that time “will remain subject to the 50 percent duty rate established by Proclamation 11048.” Two proclamations (11064 and 11065, the latter at 91 FR 58339) modify the scope of the existing 50 percent duties for goods entered on or after 12:01 a.m. ET September 15, and Proclamation 11065 states that the modified duties “shall apply in addition to duties imposed pursuant to section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.” The White House fact sheet describes the scope changes as removing products such as rock salt and cement and adding products “ranging from all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) to additional dairy products,” and states that the Section 338 tariffs “apply to all covered goods regardless of whether a good originates under the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).” Ambassador Greer described the package as “targeted import bans as authorized by Section 338 and a calibration of the underlying Section 338 tariffs,” and the President directed USTR and GSA to remove $50 billion worth of Canadian-origin products from GSA’s Multiple Award Schedules. ICPA analysis, not stated in the source: the action came the same day Canada’s counter-tariffs took effect (CBSA Customs Notice 26-23), and nothing in the proclamations creates a USMCA-origin carve-out from either the duties or the import bans. USTR statement, Sep 8 ↗ White House fact sheet, Sep 8 ↗ Proclamation 11065, 91 FR 58339 ↗
Minister LeBlanc, with Ministers Joly and Champagne and Chief Trade Negotiator Janice Charette, chaired the eighth meeting since April of the Advisory Committee on Canada-U.S. Economic Relations. Ministers Champagne and Joly “provided an update on Canada’s targeted response to the new unjustified U.S. tariffs, and on measures deployed to support workers and businesses affected by the tariffs.” The readout states that “Canada remains committed to constructive engagement where it can advance a mutually beneficial agreement that respects Canadian sovereignty and advances the interests of Canadian workers, farmers, businesses and families,” and makes no reference to resumed negotiations. ICPA analysis, not stated in the source: this is the last official Canadian readout ICPA located before the September 8 U.S. proclamations. Global Affairs Canada, Sep 4 ↗
President Sheinbaum submitted an initiative on August 28, 2026 to amend Mexico’s Ley de Inversion Extranjera, creating a mandatory prior national-security review by the National Foreign Investment Commission (CNIE) for foreign acquisitions of more than 49 percent of a Mexican company above an asset threshold the CNIE would set, in sectors including strategic infrastructure, critical and dual-use technologies (artificial intelligence, semiconductors, cybersecurity, quantum), essential inputs, food security, and access to sensitive data. The bill seats the heads of Defense, Navy and Public Security on the CNIE with voting rights, allows the Commission to authorize, condition or block a transaction, and sets a 60-business-day review, extendable by 30 days, with no deemed approval. On August 31 the Senate referred the initiative to the joint Economy and First Legislative Studies committees. This is a proposal and not yet law; if enacted it would directly implement the investment-screening element of the economic-security agenda in the joint review. Senado de la Republica, Sep 2 ↗
The accompanying backgrounder sets out the measure at the tariff-item level, 629 entries, and was itself updated as of August 26, 2026. Scope turns on whether a good is eligible to be marked as a good of the United States under the Determination of Country of Origin for the Purpose of Marking Goods (CUSMA Countries) Regulations. Goods in transit to Canada on the day the measures come into force are excluded. ICPA analysis, not stated in the backgrounder: the order defines U.S. origin by reference to the marking regulations only and does not mention the CUSMA preferential rules of origin, so members should not assume that claiming preference removes a listed good from the surtax. Administrative detail is to follow through CBSA customs notices.
The Department of Finance Canada announced counter-tariffs of 15, 25 and 50 percent on U.S.-origin goods covering $27.6 billion in imports, the same value the release attributes to the U.S. Section 338 duties on Canadian goods effective August 22. Each product’s rate is matched to the corresponding U.S. Section 338 or Section 232 rate. Named sectors are steel, dairy, appliances, agricultural equipment, pulp and paper, and electronics. The announcement was paired with a $7.5 billion support package for affected Canadian workers and businesses, on top of nearly $25 billion provided since the U.S. tariffs began. Effective 12:01 a.m., September 8, 2026.
The Department of Finance Canada published a readout of Minister Champagne’s virtual meeting with provincial and territorial finance ministers. Minister LeBlanc briefed ministers on the suspension of trade negotiations with the United States, stating that Canada had negotiated over the past 18 months with the objective of a fair and durable agreement while defending market access, sovereignty, cultural policies and key sectors. Minister Champagne outlined the response, including dollar-for-dollar counter-tariffs effective September 8 and a support package to follow. The Prime Minister had already announced the suspension in his August 22 remarks (“last evening, I suspended trade negotiations”).
After negotiations broke down late on August 21, Prime Minister Carney announced that Canada will match the new U.S. tariffs dollar for dollar, with retaliatory measures concentrated in steel, dairy, appliances, agricultural equipment, pulp and paper, and electronics, and including products currently subject to the U.S. Section 232 and Section 338 tariffs. He said the United States proposed terms that were uneconomic and unfair, asking too much and offering too little. The Canadian measures come into force the Tuesday after Labour Day, September 8, 2026. A Canadian official subsequently told the Associated Press that the detailed list would be announced on Tuesday, August 25, and Carney signaled Canada may move toward more targeted retaliation rather than strict dollar-for-dollar matching. Until the annex-level product list publishes, the precise Canadian HS coverage remains unconfirmed. Members exporting U.S.-origin goods into Canada in the named sectors should anticipate new surtaxes from September 8.
Source: Prime Minister of Canada, Aug 22 ↗ (Tier 1) · PBS NewsHour / AP, Aug 24 ↗ (Tier 2)
The duties took effect for goods entered for consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after 12:01 a.m. ET on August 22, 2026, after the three-day suspension lapsed without a negotiated resolution. CBP implementation guidance, CSMS # 69606660, directs filers to new HTSUS Chapter 99 headings 9903.03.12 through 9903.03.16, with 9903.03.12 through 9903.03.14 carrying the 50 percent additional duty. USMCA-qualifying goods are not exempt: covered Canadian-origin goods owe the Section 338 duty even when they receive preferential treatment. Coverage extends beyond the headline alcohol, dairy, and vehicle sectors, so members should screen all Canadian imports against the Annex II product lists of the three July 20 proclamations rather than relying on the sector names.
Source: CBP CSMS # 69606660, Aug 21 ↗ (Tier 1)
A presidential proclamation temporarily suspended the additional ad valorem duties of up to 50 percent imposed under Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 on certain Canadian alcoholic beverages, dairy, and motor-vehicle products, moving the effective date from August 19 to August 22, 2026. The suspension was granted in light of the ongoing negotiations and Canada’s stated commitment to remove the discriminatory measures at issue. The underlying July 20 proclamations were not repealed, so the duties resumed automatically when the suspension lapsed. Published in the Federal Register on August 24, 2026 as document 2026-17294.
Source: Federal Register, Doc. 2026-17294 ↗ (Tier 1)
Minister Dominic LeBlanc and Chief Trade Negotiator Janice Charette, both attending virtually from Washington, briefed provincial and territorial trade ministers and the Advisory Committee on Canada–U.S. Economic Relations on the week’s engagements with USTR Greer. The official readout states Canada’s priorities in the negotiations include “addressing existing sectoral tariffs and avoiding the implementation of Section 338 tariffs.” It was the second provincial briefing in two weeks. No agreement was announced.
Source: Global Affairs Canada, Aug 14 ↗ (Tier 1)
Proclamation 11052 of August 6, 2026 was published in the Federal Register on August 11 (91 FR 51975). Effective 12:01 a.m. ET on December 4, 2026, imports of polysilicon and polysilicon derivatives listed in Annexes I and II become subject to a minimum import price (MIP) program at $21 per kilogram for polysilicon, $100 per kilogram for ingots and wafers, $0.22 per watt for solar cells, and $0.38 per watt for solar modules, and polysilicon ingots and derivatives take an additional 15% ad valorem duty. At entry an importer must document or certify that the first arm’s-length U.S. sale will occur at or above the applicable MIP, or that the sale is under fixed terms in a contract predating the proclamation. Without that documentation the merchandise takes a specific tariff equal to the full MIP; with it, an entered value below the MIP takes a specific tariff equal to the shortfall. CBP enforces accuracy, and an importer found materially non-compliant — together with its affiliates — is permanently barred from importing these goods.
There is no Canada or Mexico rate carve-out. The proclamation caps the combined Section 232 and Column 1 rate at 15% for Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Switzerland, Liechtenstein and EU members, and sets 10% for the United Kingdom; USMCA-originating goods receive no equivalent relief. Canada and Mexico appear only in clause 8, which makes manufacturing drawback under 19 U.S.C. 1313(a)–(b) available for articles that are products of Trade Agreement Partners, are not subject to an AD/CVD order, and whose polysilicon content comes entirely from a Trade Agreement Partner country. That is a drawback pathway, not an exemption from the duty.
Source: Federal Register, 91 FR 51975, Aug 11 ↗ (Tier 1)
Ambassador Greer issued a statement welcoming S&P Global’s release of pricing benchmarks for gallium, germanium, tungsten, antimony, and neodymium/praseodymium, stating that “setting benchmarks like these will inform the negotiation of the Agreement on Trade in Critical Minerals” and that transparent pricing helps counter non-market distortions. The planned plurilateral agreement contemplates mineral-specific, border-adjusted price floors and builds on critical minerals action plans the U.S. has signed with Mexico, Japan, and the EU. This is the first concrete post-round signal on the pricing architecture that would underpin the U.S.–Mexico critical minerals workstream feeding the economic-security agenda.
In the July 23 joint statement, Ambassador Greer and Secretary Ebrard directed their teams to convene a fourth U.S.–Mexico bilateral negotiating round in Washington, D.C., in September 2026, giving the economic-security track a calendar-backed next step.
USTR imposed final Section 301 tariffs on 60 economies, including Canada and Mexico, for failures related to forced-labor import prohibitions. Canada confirmed the final action includes an exemption for USMCA-compliant goods, and Mexico’s economy minister said roughly 85 percent of Mexican exports remain tariff-free because they comply with USMCA rules of origin. The treaty’s preferential channel remains open, but only for firms that can substantiate compliance — raising the practical importance of origin qualification, customs evidence, and supply-chain diligence.
In Senate Finance Committee testimony, Ambassador Greer said USTR is seeking interim arrangements with Canada and Mexico by year-end while harder issues — including autos, labor, and environment — may extend into 2027. In the same testimony he described development of an Agreement on Trade in Critical Minerals using border-adjusted price floors to counter Chinese market distortions, advancing critical minerals from a page-level watch item toward a developed U.S. policy concept. This is not a USMCA amendment or a trilateral instrument.
The third bilateral round took place in Mexico City. The July 23 joint statement from Ambassador Greer and President Sheinbaum tied economic security explicitly to growing North American manufacturing, strengthening regional supply chains, and addressing free-riding from non-parties — a material expansion from a broad theme into an articulated negotiating objective. The confirmed agenda also covered autos, steel and aluminum, labor, agriculture, and electronic payment services.
The United States imposed 50 percent Section 338 tariffs on nearly $20 billion of Canadian imports, framed by USTR as a response to discriminatory treatment affecting autos, alcohol, and dairy. Prime Minister Carney responded the same day that the measure was a unilateral action inconsistent with CUSMA, adding that Canada had already submitted modernization proposals and was ready to intensify talks. The tariffs do not amend USMCA but materially change bargaining leverage; covered goods are affected as of August 19, 2026.
Reuters reported that TSMC sees strong multi-year demand for AI chips and is increasing its U.S. investment commitment to about $265 billion. This does not change USMCA law, but it reinforces the political salience of semiconductor localization, advanced-manufacturing capacity, and the energy and workforce infrastructure underpinning North American economic-security arguments.
Mexico published in the Diario Oficial de la Federación an amendment to its list of dual-use goods, software, and technologies subject to Secretariat of Economy export regulation, more closely aligning Mexican and U.S. export controls. This is the first concrete, government-confirmed economic-security action of the review, and resolves the citation previously pending on this page.
Overview
Economic security is not governed by a single self-contained USMCA chapter. It is a cross-cutting policy area implicating rules of origin and origin verification, customs enforcement and transshipment, non-market-country trade and investment, tariff alignment and trade remedies, investment screening, export controls, critical minerals, forced-labor import restrictions, state-owned enterprises, digital infrastructure and connected vehicles, and broader supply-chain resilience.
USTR’s September 2025 public-comment notice expressly sought input on “strategies for strengthening North American economic security and competitiveness” and on non-market policies and practices of third countries. In March 2026, the United States and Mexico began examining measures to ensure USMCA benefits accrue primarily to the parties — including reducing dependence on outside-region imports, strengthening rules of origin, and increasing supply-chain security. Economic security has appeared on the agenda of every 2026 U.S.–Mexico negotiating round, including the third round convening July 21–23 in Mexico City.
For compliance teams, the immediate legal requirements remain unchanged unless and until the parties adopt a legally effective amendment, FTC decision, interpretation, or coordinated domestic measure. Potential changes could nevertheless affect origin qualification, supplier and ownership documentation, investment structuring, export-control classification, and customs verification exposure.
Controlling Authorities
No single “economic security” chapter exists. These are the chapters currently governing the underlying subjects, unaffected by ongoing negotiations.
- Chapter 30 — Free Trade Commission & institutional provisions ↗
- Chapter 34 — Final Provisions (Art. 34.7 review clause) ↗
- Chapter 31 — Dispute Settlement ↗
- Competitiveness Committee (Ch. 26) records (not separately published)
- President’s 2026 Trade Policy Agenda ↗
- America First Trade Policy report ↗
- CBP guidance & rulings ↗
- Commerce/BIS export-control actions (monitor separately)
- Joint Review of CUSMA info page ↗
- What We Heard: 2025 CUSMA consultations ↗
- Minister LeBlanc statement, Jul 1 2026 ↗
- Existing national-security investment review framework (pre-existing)
Current Rule vs. Proposed Change
The most consequential comparisons on this page. Nothing here is legally effective unless labeled “confirmed by controlling authority.”
Mexican and U.S. export-control lists and licensing standards for dual-use items were not closely aligned, a gap USTR had flagged as an economic-security concern.
In July 2026, Mexico published an updated measure regulating the export of dual-use items that USTR describes as more closely aligning Mexican and U.S. export controls.
Origin qualification depends on product-specific production and content rules under Chapter 4/Annex 4-B. Foreign ownership alone does not disqualify a good that otherwise satisfies the applicable rule.
The U.S. and Mexico directed negotiators in March 2026 to scope measures ensuring USMCA benefits accrue primarily to the parties — reduced external dependence, stronger origin rules, and increased supply-chain security. No implementing mechanism has been published.
No dedicated trilateral critical-minerals instrument exists under USMCA. Mexico and the U.S. published a bilateral critical-minerals action plan in March 2026 describing resilient, market-based supply chains as an economic- and national-security priority.
Canadian government briefing materials referenced a possible U.S.-proposed “Critical Minerals Marketplace” to encourage regional mining, processing, recycling, reuse, and manufacturing. No public draft instrument located.
USMCA permits regional allocation of production among the three parties under common origin rules, without penalty for relocating production from one party to another.
Canadian government materials reported U.S. interest in mechanisms discouraging relocation of U.S. production to Mexico or Canada — potentially via U.S.-content minimums, incentive clawbacks, or procurement preferences. No public legal text located.
Vehicles qualify under current USMCA rules if they meet the agreement’s North American regional-content, labor-value, and related requirements; the treaty does not require a fixed U.S.-only content share.
Reuters reported on July 24 that Washington is pressing for vehicles to contain 50 percent U.S.-made content to qualify for preferential access, while Mexico rejects any U.S.-specific minimum and wants relief from Section 232 tariffs first. This is the clearest reported economic-security sticking point on the table — it would move the agreement away from a regional-origin test toward country-specific allocation — but USTR has not published negotiating text.
Key Legal Distinction
The distinction this tracker must preserve throughout the economic-security discussion.
Should a Chinese-owned or otherwise non-party-controlled facility located in Mexico or Canada receive ordinary USMCA treatment when its products satisfy the treaty’s origin rules?
USMCA origin ordinarily depends on where production and transformation occur, not on the nationality of ultimate shareholders. A foreign-owned facility can lawfully produce an originating good under the current rules. Chapter 14 investment protections turn on treaty definitions, reservations, control, substantial business activities, and denial-of-benefits provisions — not on a blanket ownership test.
Economic-security proposals may seek to layer beneficial-ownership disclosure, investment screening, or denial of preferences onto the existing production-based test. An ownership-based restriction could implicate investment and goods obligations if it disadvantages an enterprise legally established in another party — the outcome would depend on the measure’s construction, sectoral reservations, and applicable exceptions.
This distinction underlies nearly every economic-security proposal on this page — investment screening, tariff alignment, critical minerals, and the “benefits accrue primarily to the parties” principle all ultimately turn on whether and how a legal shift from production-based to ownership-based treatment could be implemented.
Open Legal Issues
The issue-areas ICPA is tracking under economic security, ranked by importance. Status reflects the most recent verification pass; none has been adopted as a legally effective change.
Country Positions
Formal positions inferred only from official statements, not from press reporting or meeting attendance alone.
Broadest economic-security agenda of the three parties — tariff alignment, origin rules, investment screening, export controls, critical minerals, and supply-chain resilience directed at reducing non-party benefit and dependence. Declined to renew USMCA in its current form on July 1, 2026.
In a CNBC interview, as reported by CTV News, USTR Jamieson Greer said there is “no urgency” to conclude a trade agreement with Canada and that President Trump is “comfortable” with the present situation: “We’re still getting what we need from them in terms of oil, gas, potash,” and agricultural goods continue to move across the border. Greer said “good conversations” continue with Canadian negotiators, while blaming Canada for the impasse: “We gave them a deal, they left.” ICPA analysis, not stated in the source: the interview came four days before the Section 338 import prohibitions on Canadian dairy, alcoholic beverages and motor vehicles take effect on September 29 (see the Sep 8 entry under Confirmed Developments), and Greer gave no indication that the administration intends to suspend or delay them.
Supports supply-chain security and reduced external dependence, and has taken concrete confirmed action — a July 2026 dual-use export-control update — while seeking to preserve market access and continued investment, including nearshoring.
Open to targeted economic-security modernization where it uses existing institutions, but prioritizes predictability and market access; has not yet begun substantive bilateral text-based negotiations with the United States on these issues.
At a Toronto news conference reported by The Canadian Press, Prime Minister Carney said Canada's tone with Washington is already "quite firm" and that negotiations remain constructive ahead of the August 19 effective date for the 50% Section 338 tariffs. Minister LeBlanc said Canada has "suggested bringing structure and rigour to the review process the Americans have initiated." The Globe and Mail reported Canada is weighing export quotas on steel and aluminum as a concession to reduce U.S. tariffs; Carney declined to confirm, saying "this is not the time to trigger the options, but we have options." No retaliatory tariffs have been announced.
LeBlanc and Charette met USTR Greer for about 90 minutes on August 13, their second face-to-face that week and the fourth in three weeks, as press reports say 50% tariffs on a wide range of Canadian goods are planned for August 19 absent a deal. Sectoral tariffs reported in place: 15–50% on steel, aluminum and copper; 25% on autos and trucks; 10% on softwood lumber. CBC separately reports negotiators aim to put a phase-one framework to Trump and Carney, with critical minerals and defence deferred to a later phase. The August 19 action remains a threat with no published legal instrument.
Timeline & Key Developments
Extended to entry into force. Distinguishes negotiation, consultation, and implementation events.
Research Gaps & Open Issues
Reviewed and updated with each page verification pass.
- No complete public U.S. negotiating text for an economic-security chapter or amendment has been located
- No formal trilateral definition of “economic security” has been published
- No public list of sectors covered by aligned investment screening has been identified
- No detailed proposal defining when non-party ownership would affect originating status has been located
- No public draft of a Critical Minerals Marketplace instrument has been located
- No public legal mechanism for penalizing relocation of U.S. production to Mexico or Canada has been identified
- Canada’s detailed response to U.S. offshoring-penalty proposals has not been located
- Mexico’s complete position on screening non-party (e.g., Chinese) investment remains undeveloped in public sources
Source Library
Full member library, all topics →Related Topics
ICPA’s trade law partners can help members navigate investment screening, export-control classification, beneficial-ownership disclosure, and customs verification exposure as this topic develops.
About this tracker
The USMCA Joint Review Tracker is published by the International Compliance Professionals Association (ICPA). It follows the 2026 USMCA joint review under Article 34.7: negotiating rounds, government positions, legal status, tariff and customs actions, and what each change means for importers and exporters. It is a policy and compliance tracker, not a trade-flow data dashboard.
Updated weekly and when a significant development breaks. It covers automotive, agriculture, labor, digital trade, de minimis, steel and aluminum, economic security and rules of origin, and it is built on primary sources from USTR, CBP, the White House, the Federal Register and the governments of Canada and Mexico, with every item marked as confirmed or reported.
This tracker is researched and maintained by Heather Tschirhart, who leads ICPA’s trade research and data work.
Spot something inaccurate, know of a development, article, or video that should be added, or notice something not working? Reach out any time.
Contact HeatherInternational Compliance Professionals Association (ICPA), USMCA Joint Review Tracker: Economic Security, researched and maintained by Heather Tschirhart, updated weekly, https://www.icpainc.org/usmca-joint-review-economic-security/